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Enterprise Zones as Tools of Urban
Industrial Policy
Benedicte E.F. Mathijsen*
Patterns of economic change in the developed world have severely hurt older
urban and industrial centers. Within developed nations, large scale capital invest-
ment has shifted away from cities to suburban and less developed regions. ' This
exodus of jobs and economic activity from urban centers has not been accom-
panied by the arrival of new industries requiring similar skills.2 In addition, the
overall mix of economic activity in developed nations has significantly shifted
toward services and away from manufacturing which was historically located in
the older urban centers, leaving behind many workers with obsolete skills. Thus,
many cities which grew large and powerful in the Industrial Revolution are today
bastions of abandoned or obsolete facilities and high unemployment. 3
Recognition of the failure of these cities to replace jobs lost to capital shifts
comes at a time of difficult economic conditions and increased reluctance of
central governments to support local governments economically.4 Responding to
the structural economic problems of their countries, governments have imple-
mented industrial policies intended to increase national economic growth and
* Benedicte E.F. Mathijsen is a member of the class of 1985, University of Michigan Law School.
I. The larger cities in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.)
countries are losing population while outlying regions are gaining. This is especially true for the
Northeastern United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany). ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., URBAN STATISTICS IN O.E.C.D. COUN-
TRIES 42 (Feb. 1983).
2. The decline of manufacturing in cities poses an "urban dilemma": in the wake of the exodus of
heavy industry, established small businesses and middle income residents have been left with the now
familiar characteristics of the economic erosion of urban America, chronically high unemployment,
sluggish economic growth, a declining tax base, and a smaller, less affluent group of residents who
bear the rising tax rates. Cities are forced to cut back basic services which, in turn, leads to a further
decline in the inner city. Solomon & Solomon, Enterprise Zones, Tax Incentives and the Revitaliza-
tion of Inner Cities: A Study of Supply Side Policy-Making, 1981 DET. C. L. REV. 797, 797-803
(1981).
3. See generally B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA
(1982); J. HUGHES, BRITAIN IN CRISIS: DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION AND How TO FIGHT IT (1981).
4. The New Federalism in the United States, for instance, has resulted in major cuts in federal
programs which local governments have not been able to replace. See infra note 77.
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productivity. The precise urban and regional consequences of these policies,
however, are still unknown. 5
National programs are not necessarily inconsistent with local needs and objec-
tives, but they often fail to take into account or to correct unevenness in new
investment. 6 In response, local governments erect programs designed to attract
new industry or to slow net disinvestment, often leading to destructive competi-
tion among regions to retain or entice businesses promising jobs. 7
To attract new investment to deteriorated industrial cities, thereby providing
jobs and increasing the tax base, the British Government has established the
"enterprise zone" program. 8 On the assumption that reduced business costs and
regulation will attract entrepreneurs back to the inner cities, the national govern-
ment designates certain regions hit by poverty to be enterprise zones where taxes
are lower and regulation is reduced and streamlined. 9
This note examines the operation of the enterprise zone program in the United
Kingdom and considers the program's implications for the United States (U.S.),
which also suffers from urban industrial decay and which has now begun study-
ing proposals for an enterprise zone program of its own.
The note concludes that, based on the limited data available thus far, the
enterprise zone program alone is inadequate to lure industry back to depressed
areas. The success of the enterprise zones depends in large measure upon parallel
government programs, ' 0 suggesting that the zones cannot be viewed as potential
replacements of existing government aid programs. Part I of the note describes
the British program and examines how it has performed in three major industrial
centers. Part II discusses the leading U.S. proposal and examines its underlying
assumptions. The note concludes that both the assumptions underlying the U.S.
5. See generally Urban Revitalization and Industrial Policy: Hearings before the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1980) (statement by Walter d'Al-
essio, Executive Vice President, Philadelphia Industrial Development Corp., Past President, National
Council for Urban Economic Development) (d'Alessio states that cities do need to be simply accom-
modated in an industrial policy. As centers of trade and finance, cities have a critical role to play in the
design and implementation of any industrial policy, and serve as weathervanes of our economies).
6. See Glickman, Emerging Urban Policies in a Slow-growth Economy: Conservative Initiatives
and Progressive Responses in the U.S., 1981 INT'L J. URB. & REG. RESEARCH 492, 512-13 (1980)
(Glickman warns that the burdens of reindustrialization will not be shared equally. Industrial policies
often encourage further job loss in large cities and provide greater investment for already growing
regions).
7. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES: THE CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT 224 (1980) (Bluestone and Harrison suggest that competition
among regions, states, and municipalities for industry and jobs appears to be escalating into fierce
and perhaps ruinous warfare, and offer evidence that more and more blue chip companies are taking
advantage of tax incentives).
8. See infra note 18 for citations to the specific measures.
9. The idea was initially introduced by Professor Peter Hall in 1977 in a speech at the Royal Town
Planning Institute, Chester, England on June 15, 1977. Hall intended it to be a last-ditch solution to
urban problems.
10. For a discussion of the role of the enterprise zone scheme in light of ongoing public investment
programs, particularly in three instances in the United Kingdom, see infra notes 58-73 and accom-
panying text.
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proposal for revitalization and the proposal itself are unrealistic in their current
form.
I. THE BRITISH PLAN
The United Kingdom has fared poorly in the large structural shifts of the
postwar international economy, and has experienced a significant relative per-
formance decline in relation to other developed countries. 1 It has generally been
unable either to compete with other advanced industrial countries in product
innovation or to hold its own against rapidly developing countries in efficiency
and low labor costs.
Since the industrial plant in the United Kingdom's cities typically is older and
less efficient than that in outlying areas, the country's economic decline has
manifested itself most dramatically in the core of its industrial cities, bringing
large scale job loss and deterioration in infrastructure. 12 Other factors, including
the failure of these cities to attract new investment and the mismatch between job
skills held by urban residents and those in demand by new industry, have also
contributed to the disproportionate negative impact upon cities. ' 3
Attempting to achieve industrial and commercial regeneration through a mix of
incentives and private investment, 14 Parliament implemented the enterprise zone
plan through two statutes: the Local Government Planning and Land Act and the
Finance Act of 1980. 1 The proponents of the plan believed that industry is
responsible for economic growth and that planning rules often hamper industrial
development. 16 They viewed the concept as an experiment in free development
11. Grant, British Industrial Policy: Problems and its Perception, 1982 PARL. AFF. 282, 293.
12. See generally id. at 282; URBAN DEPRIVATION AND THE INNER CITY (C. Jones ed. 1979); P.
LAWLESS, URBAN DEPRIVATION AND GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE (1979). The rapid rate of decline in
population and jobs is indicative of general distress in inner cities. Between 1966 and 1976, for
example, Manchester lost 18 percent and London 16 percent of their populations. Furthermore, a
greater proportion of skilled rather than unskilled people have left the cities. SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, WHITE PAPER POLICY FOR THE INNER CITIES 17 (June 1977) [hereinafter
cited as WHITE PAPER].
13. J. HUGHES, supra note 3, at 27 (Hughes describes the manufacturing crisis in the United
Kingdom and the unemployment crisis that ensues when multinationals reinvest in outlying regions.
He argues that adjustment of governmental intervention in the development process has been delayed
and is inadequate.); N. SPENCE, BRITISH CITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF URBAN CHANGE 289 (1982)
(Spence argues that although all industries have declined in inner cities, the decline is the symptom of
a more general process of economic change. He further argues that the employment problem of inner
cities cannot be attributed solely to environmental problems of inner cities, but to a broader re-
organization of industrial production.).
14. Local Government, Planning and Land Act, 1980, ch. 65, § 179, sched. 32; Finance Act, 1980,
ch. 48. The primary aim of the enterprise zone scheme is commercial and is not to bring mixtures of
housing and commercial uses to the zone. The plan is not geared toward depressed residential
neighborhoods; rather, the target is the old industrial areas of larger cities. Thus, the implied result is
to make segregation among various land uses even more pronounced. See, e.g., S. BUTLER, THE
ENTERPRISE ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES 107-08 (1981).
15. See S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 105.
16. 412 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 1418 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PARL. DEB.].
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similar to that which aided the rise of new economic powers such as Hong,Kong
and the Republic of China (Taiwan).17
A. Rationale
The enterprise zone approach represents a shift from using traditional govern-
ment grants and subsidies toward encouraging private investment as a motor for
economic growth. It The government's role is to provide the proper conditions
17. Originally, the Enterprise Zone scheme was to incorporate a free trade area in which customs
regulations-as in the Southeast Asian areas-were to be relaxed. The United Kingdom is limited,
however, in its freedom to establish free trade areas by its membership in the European Communities.
See generally S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 109.
18. The Labor Party supports a more centralized planning system and opposes the enterprise zone
plan. The previous Labor Administration (1974-1979) had announced a major policy initiative to deal
with problems in the most blighted areas. In contrast to the Tory plan, public funds were used in a
variety of different ways concentrating on job creation schemes, community groups, and recreational
development. See infra note 57 for further discussion of the Labor Party's strategies. See Hall,
Housing, Planning, Land and Local Finance: The British Experience, in URBAN LAND POLICY FOR
THE 1980s 47-58 (G. Lefcoe ed. 1983). With major cuts in public expenditures, the Thatcher
Government tried a different approach. The rising demands of the unemployed and the economic
decline of older inner cities sparked riots during the summer of 1981 and prompted the Thatcher
Government to undertake a two-tier strategy based on the enterprise zone and the Urban Development
Corporation (UDC). The enterprise zone is primarily financed by the private sector, whereas UDCs
are a state financed real-estate and building finance companies modeled on a type of corporation that
helped build Britain's new towns. See Arnold-Baker, Local Government, Planning and Land Act
1980: Town Development Shift, 131 NEW L.J. 417, 418 (1981). The UDCs have the authority to deal in
and develop land by acquiring both public and private land, and are able to lend money to those who
intend to build on such land under the financial powers granted by the Inner Areas Act of 1978. Id.
They also carry out building operations and allocate funds for the provision of services in the area.
The UDCs are meant to encourage private participation in the revitalization of inner cities. See Purton
& Douglas, Enterprise Zones in the United Kingdom: A Successful Experiment?, 1982 J. PLAN. &
ENVTL L. 412, 414 (1982). They exercise the financial powers granted under the Inner Urban Areas
Act of 1978 and are able to lend money to those who intend to build on such land.
The Inner Urban Areas Act also provided the legal framework within which partnerships between
local and national levels of government can provide means to depressed areas for rebuilding. Most of
the projects aimed at industrial regeneration came within the authority of these partnerships and
contained a very wide range of employment proposals. See P. LAWLEs, BRITAIN'S INNER CITIES 174
(1981). The government intended to promote industrial regeneration in urban cores by getting local
authorities involved. Although perhaps the most intensive administrative response to urban decay, the
partnership program failed in part because of the limited amount of national government expenditure
on urban programs. The partnership program was based on the premise that the effectiveness of the
private sector in urban regeneration was very limited. The program's supporters estimated that the
private s ctor would be reluctant to return to older urban areas because of a lack of commercial
activity and because more attractive areas for investment existed elsewhere. Moreover, the lack of
skilled labor and suitable industrial land in blighted urban areas made it unlikely that private sector
investment would supplement the limited resources of urban programs. The concept of the enterprise
zone, nonetheless, relies precisely on the opposite assumption, that the revitalization of inner-city
areas is going to be primarily a private sector undertaking.
Criticism of the enterprise zone idea at a Conference of Social Planners suggested that increased
expenditure on land, education, and social services is at least as likely to benefit inner-city residents
as is unqualified fiscal support to private industries. Id. at 109. Furthermore, the argument went,
solving the urban dilemma requires addressing the nation's economic structure, government policies,
and the decisions of large companies to relocate or expand. Advances within cities would have to
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under which the process of economic revival can begin. ' 9 The enterprise zone
scheme arose from the perception that traditional means used by the government
to create employment and stimulate economic growth, subsidies and grants to
existing employers, had failed.
The Tory Government was determined to try a wholly different approach.
2
1
The Conservatives began with several articles of faith. These articles may be
charaterized as follows: industries are responsible for economic growth and
planning measures only hamper industrial development; 21 the most effective way
for a government to create jobs is to improve the entrepreneurial climate of a
region; 22 because of their strong growth rates, small businesses should be the
starting point for revitalization, and market forces, as judged by individual
decision-makers, should determine the types of businesses to locate within the
targeted regions;23 finally, by encouraging companies to develop sites within the
target areas, the entire local economy would benefit from the spillover of jobs and
growth. 24 Indeed, the legislative history suggests that Parliament believed that
reviving depressed areas would reinvigorate the entire national economy.25
Consistent with these assumptions, the legislation offers the private sector
incentives in the form of tax breaks and reduced administrative controls. Admin-
istrative procedures were streamlined in the belief that excessive delays served
only to damage the British economy.26 The program was not, however, seen as a
complete replacement for existing urban aid programs; aid from these programs
continued to flow into the zones.27 Indeed, the legislation establishing enterprise
zones was not part of the Tory Government's regional or inner city programs. 28
"concentrate on greater public control of industrial production, subsidized housing markets for
poorer inner area residents, and on integrating more disadvantaged groups into the process of
decision-making." Id. at 195.
19. The critical problem is that much of the innovative entrepreneurship, once the most important
economic feature of central metropolitan areas, has disappeared as cities have decayed. See S.
BUTLER, supra note 14, at 96. See also infra notes 23, 30, and 47.
20. Purton & Douglas, supra note 18, at 413.
21. J. STAMBOLLOULAN & I. McDONALD, U.K. ENTERPRISE ZONES 14 (Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, Land Policy Roundtable Basic Concept Series No. 103, July 1982).
22. See Arnold-Baker, supra note 18, at 417-18 (the purpose is to secure regeneration by develop-
ing land and creating attractive environments so as to attract more industry and commerce). See, e.g.,
Back to the 19th Century, NEW STATESMAN, July 11, 1980, at 42 (inner cities are turned into areas free
of certain taxes, rates, and planning controls in order to enable entrepreneurs to start up businesses
and help revitalize British industries).
23. See Purton & Douglas, supra note 18, at 417 (statement by Secretary of State from Wales); see
also J. STAMBOLLOUIAN & 1. McDONALD, supra note 21, at 3.
24. See Davies, The Inner City in Britain, in ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE INNER
CITIES 7 (G. Schwartz ed. 1981); URBAN ENTERPRISE ZONES: INNER CITY PANACEA OR SUPPLY-SIDE
SHOWPIECE? 16 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Land Policy Roundtable Basic Concept Series No.
105, 1982) (stating that the Tory government's reliance on supply-side policies is based on the
assumption that tax incentives alone will create a dramatic turnaround) [hereinafter cited as SUPPLY-
SIDE SHOWPIECE].
25. PARL. DEB., supra note 16, at 1518.
26. See S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 140.
27. Existing programs are discussed in greater detail in the British case studies infra.
28. J. STAMBOLLOUIAN & I. McDONALD, supra note 21, at 14.
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B. Operation
Advantageous rules for tax and planning purposes are the main benefits to
locating in an enterprise zone. Under the Finance Act of 1980, a number of
activities conducted within the zone are exempt or enjoy reduced taxation.2 9
Other benefits of the zone include planning and tax concessions under the Local
Government, Planning and Land Act of 1980.30 Industrial and commercial prop-
erties are exempt from local authority taxes, except for taxes on water, with the
national government reimbursing the local authority for any loss. 3' Firms may
take a 100 percent deduction against income for tax purposes for capital expendi-
tures on plant and machinery and 50 percent deduction for construction, exten-
sion, or improvement of industrial and commercial buildings. Offices, shops,
and other commercial buildings receive no benefits. 
32
Firms in enterprise zones receive priiority for special customs facilities. They
need not submit information to Industrial Training Boards and are exempt from
their levies. 33 The planning process for zones is simplified, with the government
demanding less statistical information. For each zone, a plan is prepared setting
out the types of developments for which permission is automatically granted.34
For developments that do not conform and thus, require individual variances,
applications will be expedited.
The power to select regions as enterprise zones rests in London's admin-
istrative discretion, upon consultation with local authorities. The government
considers the severity of the economic problems in the area, the failure of past
special measures to ameliorate the difficulties, the interest shown by local au-
thorities, and the availability of land for development.35 The local authorities
must prepare a planning scheme and comply with statutory requirements for
consultation with adequate public notice. 36 Local authorities must also be pre-
pared to defend the planning scheme in the courts and in Parliament. Since 1981,
the Secretary of State, who manages the enterprise zone program, has designated
eleven areas to be established as enterprise zones for ten-year periods. " Sites,
which had to show development potential, were selected in different regions in
the United Kingdom to test the effectiveness of the enterprise zone approach in
differing circumstances. 
38
29. Finance Act, 1980, ch. 48. For example, real estate developers operating in a zone are not
subject to the 60 percent tax levied upon the develpment value realized from selling an interest in
land. Id. at 110.(I).
30. Local Government, Planning and Land Act, 1980, sched. 32, 27.(1) and 29.(l).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. REFERENCE SERVICES, CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, PUB. No. 140/82, BRITAIN'S
ENTERPRISE ZONES AND URBAN DEVELPMENT CORPORATIONS 2 (June 1982).
34. Id.
35. The sites are approximately 500 acres each. S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 110.
36. Id. See also Local Government, Planning and Land Act, 1980, ch. 65, § 179, sched. 32, 2.(2),
2.(3), 2.(6).
37. Enterprise zones have been established in Corby, Dudley, Hartlepool, Isle of Dogs, Newcastle,
Trafford, Speke, and Wakefield in England; Lower Swansea Valley in Wales; Clydebank in Scotland;
and Belfast in Northern Ireland. REFERENCE SERVICES, supra note 33, at 1.
38. In determining the development potential of an area, the national government expected local
ENTERPRISE ZONES 239
C. Criticism.
Analysts, business leaders, and the opposition have expressed a number of
doubts about the enterprise zone program. 39 First, the evidence indicates that it is
extremely difficult in the United Kingdom or in the United States to entice
industries to locate in central cities due to the uncertainty of demand there, the
growth in outlying regions, and the rapid decline of urban infrastructure. 40 The
opponents of the bill feared that communities would fight for an enterprise zone
designation. By competing with one another to win more companies and jobs,
they would relinquish control over important regional functions. 4' Not requiring
a planning application from incoming businesses would be dangerous. Some
activities might affect important rights of the local population without the protec-
tion of governmental review or the possibility of a planning appeal.
4
During parliamentary debates, some members of Parliament also feared that
the enterprise zone would benefit those organizations and businesses that do not
need assistance. 43 The legislation would enable private entrepreneurs to produce
makeshift schemes to "provide a few miserable jobs in areas where the standards
would be less than adequate."
Some industrialists were concerned that the boundaries of the enterprise zone
would create unfair competition by arbitrarily providing incentives to some and
not to others. 45 Thus, some firms would benefit from rate concessions by fortuity
of location without having made any prior investment commitment to the zones.
The lack of government control over the type of enterprise attracted to the zone
poses several dangers. 46 Some private decisions stimulated by the program may
have deleterious effects within the zone or adjacent areas. For example, if growth
of a zone is the result of firms relocating rather than starting up, the "vacuum
effect" on outlying regions may simply lead to the restructuring of investment
rather than to an increase in output overall. 47 The government concedes that
governments to show their willingness to enact similar provisions to reduce taxes and streamline
regulations. SUPPLY-SIDE SHOWPIECE, supra note 24, at 2. J. STAMBOLLOUIAN & 1. McDONALD,
supra note 21, at 4.
39. PARL. DEB., supra note 16, at 1478.
40. Id. at 1459.
41. Id. at 1505-7.
42. Id. at 1467.
43. Id. at 1451.
44. Id. at 1448.
45. Butler questions the inclusion in the package of firms that do not generate jobs and do not
expand. S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 118; J. STAMBOLLOUIAN & I. McDONALD, supra note 21, at6,
7.
46. See generally SUPPLY-SIDE SHOWPIECE, supra note 24, at 10 (stating that greenlining sites may
make zones thrive merely at the expense of neighboring areas whose jobs and resources are lost to the
designated site). According to a critic, zones "are likely to have little impact on the level of economic
activity, appear to be based on a fundamental misconception of how labor markets operate, and Pre
likely to influence the distribution of commercial activity in a manner which will impose substantial
disadvantages on existing traders." Enterprise Zones 'Unlikely to Help Economy', The Times
(London), July 31, 1980, at 18.
47. The Minister for Local Government Affairs stated that any of these assistance and promotion
schemes run the risk of attracting firms from elsewhere; however, the issue is whether the scheme can
stimulate growth of new enterprises. P. LAWLESS, supra note 18, at 181.
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relocation is bound to occur under any program that provides benefits to a small
area. 
48
The enterprise zone plan focuses on larger corporations as potential agents for
investment in the targeted areas. The plan's incentives are geared exclusively to
large corporations and operate to the advantage of property owners and devel-
opers but not local residents. 49 Yet, small firms may be more successful instru-
ments for urban regeneration.50 The plan fails to address the needs of small
businesses, which are usually in low marginal tax rates and which lack start-up
funds to acquire equipment and make other capital expenditures. 5' Small busi-
nesses rarely undertake construction projects and lack profits against which tax
allowances can be taken. 2 Even so, one of the plan's principal components is
reduction of taxes. The scheme also fails to include measures for training un-
skilled workers. This is a critical omission in view of the need most small
businesses have for skilled labor. 53
In summary, the tax-cutting focus of the plan appears inadequate to create jobs
in depressed areas. Moreover, the assumption that the jobs and the firms appear-
ing in target areas will be a net gain to the national economy is open to dispute. 5 4
Labor unions have strongly objected to the enterprise zone legislation because
they perceive it to be a direct threat to the entire labor movement. Indeed, the
initial proposals even included waivers, later dropped, of minimum wage rules.
The suspicion that these early proposals would resurface led the unions to fear
that lack of enforcement of existing safety laws would lead the firms to violate
workers' safety laws. 55 Because of the danger of deterioration in worker safety,
48. See, e.g., Aronowitz & Goodman, Ghetto Enterprise Zones: A Walk on the Supply Side,
NATION, Feb. 21, 1981, at 207 (stating that the enterprise zone legislation reflects the government's
effort to apply supply-side economics to social problems and an update of an early industrial
proposition that what is good for business is good for the country). Basically, the proponents reason
that rapid growth in the 19th century was associated with an absence of government regulations and a
very low level of taxation, and that by reintroducing similar conditions, investment can be attracted in
decaying inner cities. See generally infra note 80, at 5 (statement by Marc Bendick, Jr., economist
with the Urban Institute).
49. S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 121, 142; P. LAWLESS, supra note 18, at 181.
50. See Birch, Who Creates Jobs?, 1981 PUB. INTEREST 3 (Birch argues that all new job oppor-
tunities in the United States are products of small businesses and that rapid economic growth has been
characterized by a high rate of new small firms. Since growth did not occur in larger corporations,
small firms appeared to generate growth.). Contra B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 3, at
221 (arguing that the tendency towards deindustrialization among large corporations-principally
through foreign investment, mergers and diversification-means that by default the growth that did
occur took place in smaller businesses).
51. See infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text for further discussion on small business.
52. See S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 120-22.
53. Solomon & Solomon, supra note 2, at 818.
54. P. LAWLESS, supra note 18, at 174.
55. "The firms would try to weaken rights of workers, especially in relation to unfair dismissal and
union recognition." quoted in, S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 113 NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
ON THE LABOUR PARTY, ENTERPRISE ZONES 6 (1980). Although the proponents of the bill agreed to
delete any suggestion in the bill that minimum wages be reduced, labor unions feared that enterprise
zone deregulation would still weaken worker rights, safety, and union deregulation. Under the
legislation as passed, enterprise zones benefit from simplified planning and building controls but they
are not free from controls on environmental pollution, health, and safety. Hall, supra note 18, at 54.
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the press characterized the concept as a return to 19th century conditions.56 The
trade union opponents seek primarily the creation of more jobs and the raising of
the average skill level of workers. 
5 7
D. Examples
To illustrate the operation of enterprise zones, this note will examine three
cases. Evaluation of the results of each zone is incomplete, and available infor-
mation is sparse. The results available thus far indicate achievements only in site
preparation and rehabilitation of existing structures.58
1. Manchester
A heavily industrialized city, Manchester has lost a large number of manufac-
turing jobs in the last decade, and is consequently experiencing a drop in its
population.5 9 Plants have shrunk or closed as relative productivity has fallen,
facilities have become outdated, and structural declines have hit certain types of
heavy industry concentrated in Manchester.
Three enterprise zones were designated in the Trafford Park Industrial Estate
(TPIE), an industrial development region in Manchester, and will operate there
for ten years. 6° Simplified planning and regulatory criteria ensure speedy han-
dling of applications for location in the zone. The greatest benefit of the program
56. PARL. DEB., supra note 16, at 1478.
57. The previous Labor Administration announced in 1977 a major policy initiative to deal with the
problem of inner city decay and unemployment. WHITE PAPER, supra note 12. By granting explicit
priority in social and economic policy to inner areas, the Labor Government tried to tailor programs
to the specific problems of individual cities. The premise of the White Paper is that measures can be
taken in order to avoid displacement of existing industries and encourage stabilization and develop-
ment of all firms.
The Labor party identified employment as the main problem of cities. Low demand for labor was
particularly severe in inner cities, which traditionally have a significant concentration of unskilled and
semi-skilled workers. As important as employment is, however, it seems apparent that the real test of
success of an urban scheme is the degree to which residents' life has improved overall. This would
seem to dictate some emphasis on housing where physical decay is especially relevant. However, the
enterprise zone ignores housing.
The White Paper sets forth four basic aims to reverse decay and unemployment: economic,
physical and social improvement and a balance of population and jobs between inner areas and
outlying areas. The means chosen to implement these goals is increased public investment with more
emphasis on jobs, training, the environment, and improvement of existing housing. Under this
approach, the private sector would be encouraged to invest in and direct government investment
would be applied to areas with major structural problems.
58. Most of the information available through the local administration of the zones is promotional
and does not include overall growth in employment or firms.
59. See, e.g., Dicken & Lloyd, The Corporate Dimension of Employment Change in the Inner
City, in URBAN DEPRIVATION AND THE INNER CITY 34 (C. Jones ed. 1979). This trend is not limited
to Manchester. Preliminary returns from the 1981 Census indicated that 1.5 million persons left major
British cities for outlying regions.
60. Before the enterprise zone program began, the TPIE enjoyed "intermediate area status" under
an earlier aid program embodied in the Inner Area Act. The tightening of criteria cost the region this
status and deprived it of government grants toward the cost of building manufacturing sites. P.
LAWLESS, supra note 18, at 140.
242 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES
to local businesses is that local authority property taxes are suspended until
1991.61
A recent Trafford Policy Committee report, outlining the principal problems of
the zone, concluded that the zone had succeeded in creating and retaining em-
ployment opportunities.62
[H]ad it not been for the Enterprise Zone status of certain areas of the [TPIE], a fair
proportion of new companies would have moved elsewhere, and, in some in-
stances, certain companies would have only contemplated closing. The local offi-
cials feel that the designation of an Enterprise Zone draws the attention of industry
to the benefits of investing in the Borough.63
2. Clydebank
Clydebank, a major industrial city in Scotland, fell upon hard times with the
1979 closure of the giant Singer works as markets for sewing machines and ocean
liners declined and lower-cost producers entered the market. 64 The Scottish De-
velopment Agency (SDA) poured money into the area prior to its designation as
an enterprise zone, offering incentives to encourage redevelopment. 
65
Seen as complementing, but not replacing the activities of the SDA, the zone
program publicizes the various benefits available to companies locating there and
provides worker training to teach skills required for changing technology. 66 The
SDA also established an enterprise zone fund offering commercial loans to
companies with the potential of creating new jobs. 67 Clydebank also benefits
from the nation's highest rate of regional and inner city assistance.
68
While it is difficult to separate the results of the zone from those generated by
the SDA, the combined package has shown impressive results. Over 2,000 new
jobs were projected for the end of 1983, half of which were generated by newly
established firms. 69 This growth stimulated considerable demand for small facili-
61. See J. STAMBOLLOUIAN & 1. MCDONALD, supra note 21, at 12. Exemption from industrial and
commercial property rates promote private investment and development of land. This approach is a
significant departure from earlier programs where the government would claim and rehabilitate the
land to stimulate private investment.
62. POLICY COMMITTEE, TRAFFORD BOROUGH COUNCIL, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT-ENTER-
PRISE ZONES-EFFECTS OF LOCAL MONITORING PROCEDURES, REPORT OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 3
(Apr. 19, 1982).
63. Id. at 3; Trafford Park Enterprise Zone Scheme, Metropolitan Borough of Trafford (May 28,
1981); Letter to author from R.M. Dodsworth, Industrial Development Officer, Trafford Enterprise
Zone (Nov. 4, 1983) (copy on file, Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies).
64. Dicken & Lloyd, supra note 59, at 59 (reporting on a study that in a recession, plant closure
has been the more frequently chosen option than the alternative of shedding labor and maintaining
plants that run below effective capacity).
65. The Clydebank Task Force was set up in order to stimulate investment in the zone. Letter to
author from J. Cunningham, Development Officer, Clydebank Task Force (Nov. 2, 1983) (copy on
file, Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies). The growth identified by the Task Force is in
industrial promotion investment, factory building, environmental improvement and small business
advice. CLYDEBANK TASK FORCE, POSITION STATEMENT 2 (Sept. 1, 1983).
66. J. STAMBOLLOUIAN & I. McDONALD, supra note 21, at 7.
67. CLYDEBANK TASK FORCE, supra note 65, at 4.
68. S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 114.
69. CLYDEBANK TASK FORCE, supra note 65, at 2.
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ties. This is in contrast to the city's surplus of giant plants. To redress this
imbalance, the SDA invested significant amounts of money to develop small
units.7 0 The Clydebank experience demonstrates the interdependent character of
several urban aid programs.
3. London
The Isle of Dogs, located in London's former dockland area consists of former
docklands, dock basing warehouses, and vacant land.7 The closing of docks and
transfer of port activities elsewhere led to economic decay and the designation of
the area as an enterprise zone in May 1982.
Much of the land in the area is owned by the London Docklands Development
Corporation (LDDC), which is implementing a multifaceted development pro-
gram for industrial, recreational, and residential development. 7 2 The LDDC itself
converts sites and markets them according to the goals of maximizing job crea-
tion and of conforming new construction to the LDDC's master plan.73 The
LDDC also has cut planning requirements to speed project completion and is
currently in the process of expanding its services generally. Since designation as
an enterprise zone is only a small part of a larger program, assessment of the
zone's results is difficult.
II. THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL
Responding to a trend of inner-city industrial disinvestment in the United
States, 74 the Reagan Administration introduced the Enterprise Zone Employment
70. CLYDEBANK TASK FORCE, HISTORICAL SUMMARY AND SITUATION REPORT 4 (Nov. 1980).
71. The regeneration of the London Docklands is under the control of the London Dockland
Development Corporation (LDDC) set up in 1981 to improve employment, housing, shopping, and
recreational facilities to benefit the area and, ultimately, London. The enterprise zone is, therefore,
part of a larger project that also includes special incentives for industries and companies that are
outside the zone. So far, a third of the 750 newly created positions are within the zone. See ISLE OF
Docs ENTERPRISE ZONE, THE GUIDE 12 n.d.
72. P. LAWLESS, supra note 18, at 260.
73. Special engineering studies carried out for building purposes are made available to prospective
developers.
74. See generally Hicks, National Urban Land Policy: Facing the Inevitability of City and
Regional Evolution, 5 URB. L. & POL'Y 235-53 (1982) (discussing the transformation of urban
industrial America); see also Schwartz, Urban Policy and the Inner Cities in the United States, in
ADVANCED INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE INNER CITIES 47 (G. Schwartz ed. 1981) (asserting that
central cities are no longer the primary competitors for growing industries and businesses); N.Y.
Times, June 9, 1980, § 1, at 18 (quoting Professor Kasarda at a symposium of the President's
Commission for a National Agenda for the 1980s, saying that although massive centralized indus-
trialization is over, cities continue to play important roles as financial management and entertainment
centers despite deterioration in residential areas and personal income levels; N.Y. Times, Jan. 3,
1983, § 1, at 15 (cities have been hit harder than in any downward economic turn since World War II).
The 1980 census figures show widening disparities between residents of central cities in metropolitan
areas and residents of surrounding suburbs, not only in income but also in employment, housing,
living arrangements, and family structure. Cities and suburbs combined represent three-quarters of
the nation's population. The current recession, however, has worsened the disparities in income with
central city residents bearing the brunt of layoffs and reductions of federal aid. A Brookings Institute
Study suggests that downtown renewal and gentrification are not sufficient to reverse the decay in
older cities. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1983, § 1, at I, col. 2.
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and Development Act of 1983, 75 a package of tax cuts and regulatory relief to
amend the Internal Revenue Code. 
7 6
A. Rationale
The goal of the proposed legislation is to revitalize economically decaying
urban areas without involving the federal government in the development pro-
cess.77 The federal government establishes the environment for local develop-
ment strategies by providing incentives rather than subsidies."7 The government
bases the assumption of viability of state-established enterprise zones on the
premise that enterprise zones at the local level will effectively complement
federal incentives.
79
The enterprise zone scheme would not replace existing aid programs, such as
development grants, loan guarantees, and job training programs. Instead, enter-
prise zones seek to stimulate small businesses not covered by existing pro-
75. The Administration's bill was introduced as S. 98 and H.R. 1955 in Congress. S. 98, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1955, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 1955].
Two other bills on the enterprise zone proposal will not be discussed here: The Community As-
sistance and Revitalization Act of 1983, S. 863, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 1735, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess.; and the Enterprise Development and Industrial Revitalization Act of 1983, S. 634, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess.
The 1982 proposals introduced in the 97th Congress are discussed in Note, Federal Enterprise
Zone Proposals: Incentives to Revive Our Decaying Inner-cities, 10 J. LEGIS. NOrRE DAME 425
(1983).
During the 98th Congress two hearings were held on the enterprise zone legislation before the
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee. See infra note 80. No action
was taken on any of the bills by the end of the session, October 12, 1984. In his State of the Union
address, President Reagan urged Congress to pass the enterprise zone legislation. STATE OF THE
UNION-ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 25, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 322, 323 (1985). So far, one bill has been reintroduced in the House by Congressman McDade.
Enterprise Zone Employment and Development Act of 1985, H.R. 38, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
76. The specific form of the legislation is a series of amendments to Title 26 of the U.S. Code, the
Internal Revenue Code. Among other changes, the bill would add a Subchapter C, Designation of
Enterprise Zones to chapter 80, and would add a section 44H, Credit of Enterprise Zone Employ-
ment, to Subchapter A of chapter I. Currently, the Code contains only a few provisions giving special
tax treatment to specific geographic areas. For example, rules for mortgage subsidy bonds are more
liberal in certain areas for the purpose of promoting housing development. I.R.C. § 103A (1983).
77. This involves a policy decision setting forth the appropriate roles of government in providing
assistance to metropolitan areas. The approach of the Reagan Administration was summarized in an
Urban Policy Paper urging cities to save themselves. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1982, § 1, at I. The press
quickly accused the federal government of abdicating responsibility. See, e.g., id. at 17. Eventually,
the President repudiated the policy paper.
A recent survey indicated that despite enduring layoffs of city employees and higher taxes, cities
are not able to replace cuts in federal aid with local funds. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1980, § 1, at 15, col. I.
Furthermore, the oldest cities are continuing to decline and economic activities have been too small to
boost the aggregate level of prosperity. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1980, § 1, at I. It has been argued that the
single most important contributing factor the cities' growth is the federal government's encourage-
ment of their economic development. Huth, New Hope for the Revival of America's Cental Cities,
ANNALS, Sept. 1980, at 118.
78. S. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE ZONES: TIME TO AcT (Heritage Foundation Issue Bull. No. 100,
Nov. 17, 1983).
79. See infra note 87 for state enterprise zone schemes.
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grams, 0 by reducing the real cost of wages and investment and by streamlining
regulation. The tools to be employed are tax incentives for hiring workers and for
making investments in enterprise zones, and procedures to waive or modify
certain federal agency rules to facilitate economic development. 81 The bill's
rationale is that economic activity will respond favorably to tax breaks and
reduction in regulation. 
8 2
B. Operation
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) would administer
the program. 83 After local and state governments nominated the zones, the Secre-
tary of HUD would designate the zones for a ten-year period with possible
extensions.84 The Secretary would ensure that the area meets the requirements of
an enterprise zone. Selection would depend upon the degree of local commitment
to redevelopment and certain levels of poverty, unemployment, economic and
general distress, or noticeable decline in housing and population over the preced-
ing ten years. 85 The local government would have to demonstrate its commitment
to revitalizing the area by tailoring its own regulatory program and implementing
the objectives of the scheme. 
86
In seeking further support for the federal proposal, HUD cites several state-
implemented zones. In particular, the Administration cites the progress achieved
by the states in laying down the foundation of the enterprise zone legislation. 87
80. Enterprise Zones-1983: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Finance, on S. 98, S. 634, and
S. 863, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Enterprise Zones:
Hearings on H.R. 1955 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 2
(unpublished, Nov. 17, 1983) (statement by Congressman Jack Kemp) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings.]
81. H.R. 1955, supra note 75, at § 101(a) (I.R.C. § 7871(d)(2)). Throughout this note, references to
provisions of the Reagan proposal will be made first to the sections of the bill and then, paren-
thetically, to the Internal Revenue Code that they would amend.
82. Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 215 (statement by Senator Rudy Boschwitz).
83. H.R. 1955, supra note 75, at § 101(a) ( I.R.C. § 7871 (a)).
84. Id. § 101(a) (I.R.C. § 7871 (b)).
85. Id. § 101(a) (I.R.C. § 7871 (c)). The area must be within the jurisdiction of the government
nominating it, of a certain size (population of at least 1,000), and of a certain poverty level, JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 98th CONG., Ist SESS., DESCRIPTION OF BILLS (H.R. 1955, H.R. 1735, AND
H.R. 2375) RELATING TO DISTRESSED AREA TAX INCENTIVES SCHEDULED FOR A HEARING BEFORE
THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS ON NOVEMBER 17, 1983, at 15 (Comm. Print 1983). The rate of
unemployment must be at least 1.5 times the national unemployment rate. The legislation, however,
does not define the terms "pervasive poverty, unemployment and general distress" as used in the
legislation. House Hearings, supra note 80, at 14 (statement by Martin D. Levine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Education, Employment, Housing and Community Development, Congressional Budget
Office).
86. House Hearings, supra note 80, at 3 (statement by Congressman Jack Kemp stressing that the
Enterprise Zone is designed to complement whatever the local government can offer).
87. Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 75 (statement by Senator John H. Chafee). States have had
enterprise zones for a longer period of time. Connecticut created an enterprise zone in 1981, followed
by Arkansas and Illinois. Eleven zones have been established so far, and more states are considering
similar legislation. OCU SCHOOL OF LAW & LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY, E.Z. GAZETTE,
Fall 1983.
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Although the overall goal of state programs is to stimulate private sector invest-
ment in central cities, the means adopted are different." 8 The bill would allow the
Secretary of HUD to revoke the enterprise zone benefits when local governments
do not comply with the requirements. 8 9 Some suggest, however, that the govern-
ments of designated zones whose benefits are about to be revoked, should at least
be notified and given an opportunity to amend their policies. 90 Once a firm
locates in a designated zone and meets the minimum requirements, it would
automatically be entitled to the benefits of the scheme. 9' The success of the
program would depend not only on federal measures but also on state and local
government contributions'through their own tax relief measures. 92 The federal
package is thus designed to complement local measures. For an area to be
designated an enterprise zone for federal purposes, the state and local govern-
ments would have to pledge specific actions to reduce "the various burdens borne
by employers and employees in such area."
93
The legislation seeks to offer every incentive to encourage business to remain
and to expand in distressed areas. "Making tax incentives available to all busi-
nesses in an enterprise zone ensures the most economically efficient expansion of
business activity and job creation in economically distressed areas." 94
88. Id. at 4-5 (1983). The most recent report on state enterprise zones demonstrates wide variation
in the criteria chosen to designate a zone and in the incentives provided. The means to encourage
redevelopment are also different. Tax exemptions cover sales and use taxes, franchise license taxes,
or are fixed at a certain rate. To qualify as a distressed area in some states, a locality must show
significant social problems; in others, it must show a loss of population or a percentage of welfare
recipients. There is no uniform state enterprise zone legislation.
Another recent report concludes that these enterprise zone programs "have given a promising start
to a new economic development initiative. In establishing a "climate of opportunity" for businesses
and residents alike, local and state officials have pointed the way to a more effective national approach
to resolving a pressing problem." R. COWDEN & G. BONETro, ENTERPRISE ZONE AcrIViTy IN THE
STATES 4-5 (Sabre Foundation, Nov. 1983). The new jobs have benefited the long-term unemployed,
and new projects have had a great impact on the manufacturing sector. (29 percent of the total
economic activity in these zones consists of manufacturing activities as opposed to 21 percent
economy-wide). The states offer various tax relief incentives but the report stresses that more impor-
tant are the streamlining of regulatory procedures and efforts to clean up the area are more important.
The report also projected that the Treasury Department overestimated revenue losses from the tax
incentives granted in the zones. Estimated at one billion dollars, the loss would, however, be partly
compensated by gains based on sales taxes from the goods produced. Furthermore, the Foundation
expects a number of failures of new businesses which will prevent initial business losses from being
carried over to later tax years and weighing on Treasury receipts. In other words, new businesses may
not cause any tax expenditure.
89. H.R. 1955, supra note 75, at § 101(a) (I.R.C. § 7871 (b)(2)).
90. Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 208 (statement on behalf of the National League of Cities).
91. Id. at 394, 403 (statement of the National Council for Urban Economic Development). Earlier
proposals set a threshold percentage for hiring new and disadvantaged workers in order to meet the
enterprise zone requirements. Removing this criterion weakens the effective creation of new jobs.
92. Id. at 6 (statement by Marc Bendick, Jr.).
93. H.R. 1955, supra note 75, at § 101(a) (I.R.C. § 7871(d)(1)).
94. Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 9 (statement by Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the
Treasury).
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C. Tax Incentives Under the Proposal
Several tax benefits would be available under the proposed scheme. There are
no provisions under present law for the federal income tax of an employer to vary
according to the location of its employees. 95 Under the proposed scheme the
employer in the zone would be eligible to claim a tax credit9 covering the excess
of present wages over the existing wages prior to the nomination, and an amount
of the wages paid to disadvantaged workers. 97 Under the bill's scheme, an em-
ployee working in a zone could claim a nonrefundable tax credit of five percent of
her qualified wages. 9s Historically, only certain low income families with chil-
dren have been allowed an earned income credit.
The plan would grant a special investment tax credit for certain real and
personal property in addition to the existing investment tax credit. 99 The basic
credit would go toward depreciable tangible property, the special credit for prop-
erty acquired and put in service for the period of the zone. 100
Capital gains taxation would be eliminated for transactions involving property
used for an enterprise zone trade or business as well as for transactions involving
an interest in an enterprise zone "qualified business. " 01 In other words, the gain
from such transactions would not be treated as gain, provided certain enterprise
zone requirements are met.
Property financed with tax-exempt bonds in an enterprise zone would not be
restricted in recovering depreciation deductions. 02 Furthermore, although most
small issue industrial revenue bonds will lose their tax- exempt status in 1986,
owners of bonds issued by a municipality for the benefit of enterprise zone firms,
would continue to be exempt from tax on the interest, reducing the cost of
borrowing by the firm. 
0 3
The tax relief would reduce the amount of taxes paid by an employer, thereby
95. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 85, at 3.
96. H.R. 1955, supra note 75, at § 201 (I.R.C. § 44H). The federal income tax incentive
provisions are under Title 11 of the bill. Credits for employers and employees is one of the principal
provisions of the bill. Id.
97. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 85, at 19. In order to compute the employment credit,
the qualified wages must be paid to qualified employees. A "qualified employee" is defined under §
201(f) as an individual whose services for the employer are related at least 90 percent to the
employer's trade or business located in a zone, and who performs at least 50 percent of the services in
the enterprise zone.
98. Id. at 24. The credit would phase out on the twenty-first anniversary of the enterprise zone
designation. The term "qualified wages" represents all remuneration paid for the services of a
qualified employee excluding any compensation from the government, up to one and one half times
the wage base in effect for the purpose of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
99. Id. at 25.
100. H.R. 1955, supra note 75, at § 211 (I.R.C. § 48 (a)(l)). This additional credit is given to new
construction as well as rehabilitation of buildings (three to five percent tax credit is allowed for
personal property; ten percent for new real property).
101. H.R. 1955, supra note 75, at § 221 (I.R.C. § 1201(a)). The tax treatment for gain from sales of
qualified treatment extends beyond the duration of the zone.
102. H.R. 1955, supra note 75 at § 231 (I.R.C. § 168 (f)(12)(C)).
103. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 85, at 31.
248 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES
freeing up funds for capital investment and creation of new jobs. 104 The credit to
employers for hiring new workers is intended to encourage on-the-job training. 105
Employees will also receive a tax credit designed to attract workers to the
zone. 106 Capital gains exclusions are intended to stimulate investment in the zone
by real estate developers and enterpreneurs starting new (especially small) busi-
nesses. 107 The Reagan Administration insists that these will be particularly suc-
cessful because the program does not use subsidies and establishes no new
bureaucracies. If no new business activity results, it presents no cost to the
taxpayer (other than a revenue loss), as businesses already present in the zone
take advantage of certain tax credits in the scheme. 0
Regulatory relief is designed to ensure the rapid implementation of the enter-
prise zone program. Zoning and building permits would be expedited, land
would be provided, and fire and police protection would be increased. 109 This
relief would not apply to health and safety regulations, nor to laws prohibiting
discrimination. ll0 The local and state governments benefiting from an enterprise
zone designation would be able to "petition for relief in their approved zones
from any federal regulations not specifically required by the statute. For instance,
regulations presently imposed by the Small Business Administration, the Internal
Revenue Service, HUD, and the Commerce Department would be relaxed or
waived." IIl
D. Criticism
Some critics of the enterprise zone plan consider it inadequate, since a lower
tax structure by itself may not suffice to attract firms to an enterprise zone. Tax
incentives, critics argue, are not the most efficient means of relieving the most
serious constraints on business survival and growth in the inner city."2 Oppo-
nents also point out that the legislation, as currently proposed, provides relief
based on corporate income tax to businesses organized in the corporate form.
Unincorporated businesses, however, perhaps more represented in distressed
areas, do not receive assistance. 113
104. Id. at 18. See Unger, Enterprise Zone: Anglo-American Development, 5 URB. L. & POL'Y
129, 144 (1982).
105. House Hearings, supra note 80, at 5 (statement by Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the
Treasury).
106. S. BUTLER, supra note 14, at 139.
107. See generally Reagan sends to Congress Message on Enterprise Zones, 41 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 634 (1983) (text of President Reagan's message to Congress on Enterprise Zones).
108. House Hearings, supra note 80, at 5 (statement by Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the
Treasury).
109. Senate Hearings, supra note 80, at 77 (statement by Senator Arlen Specter).
110. Id. at 99 (statement by Samuel R. Pierce, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Affairs).
Ill. Id. at 98.
112. House Hearings, supra note 80, at 5 (statement by Marc Bendick, Jr.) (suggesting that
although the advocates of the zone see heavy taxation as reducing financial returns to work and to
invest, taxation in only one of the factors contributing to high unemployment).
113. Id. at II.
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The National Council for Urban Economic Development has argued that tax
incentives are not sufficient to attract investment in areas where other elements,
such as trained workforce, suitable land, efficient infrastructure, and public
services to assist development, are missing. 114 The National League of Cities,
which also questions the tax relief approach, believes that the problems facing
inner cities do not just lie in high taxes. The government needs to identify and
respond to the particular problems each area faces. "15 The League and the United
States Conference of Mayors, however, do not oppose the enterprise zone legisla-
tion in its entirety. The Conference, while supporting the ideas underlying the
bill, believes start-up funds are imperative in helping new businesses and urges
Congress to establish a "new venture fund." Furthermore, the program's tax
credits are of greater benefit to larger firms than to smaller enterprises because the
latter require more direct aid in the form of start-up funds. Tax deductions and
credits will not help until the firm has been operating for some time. 6
Several observers feel that the proposal's requirement of additional substantial
concessions by states and their political subdivisions necessary in creating a
zone, imposes unreasonable demands on already over burdened local govern-
ments. "7 The provisions of the bill would require local and state governments to
forfeit revenues or increase services in order to encourage private businesses to
take on investment risks that might not succeed. "8 It is not entirely clear whether
the risk and time weighted rewards which the enterprise zone offers outweigh the
costs or revenue losses. Competition among cities and states to attract corporate
investment is already fierce. "9 The self-nomination process enshrined in the bill
may further increase this competition. Smokestack chasing among cities that are
already in decline indicates further that a package of tax incentives may not
provide the best climate for economic development. 0
The Reagan Administration believes that small businesses are the preferred
means for economic growth in depressed areas, because they tend to generate
114. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1982, § 1, at 17, col. 5.
115. Id. The National League of Cities is more supportive of the Reagan Administration's views
than is the Conference of Mayors. The former agrees with putting responsibilities back at the local
level and relieving the federal government of some of its local programs. The fund would be used to
promote development at the local level. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1982, § 1, at 17, col. 5.
116. Harrison, The Politics and Economics of the Urban Enterprise Zone Proposal: A Critique, 6
INT'L J. URB. & REG. RESEARCH 422, 425 (1982).
117. A study by a joint Congressional Economic Committee reveals that 50 percent of U.S. cities
are spending more for operational expenses than they are collecting; recent federal cuts are exacerbat-
ing the financial difficulties the cities are undergoing and may drive them to the brink of collapse.
N.Y. Times, May 17, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1. 118. H.R. 1955, supra note 75, at § 101 (a) (I.R.C. § 7871
(d)(2)).
119. See generally Kelly, Corporate Prosperity and Urban Decline, URB. CONCERNS, Feb.-Mar.
1980, reprinted in Urban Revitalization and Industrial Policy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on the
City of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 364-71
(1980) (Kelly provides numerous examples of larger corporations that have bargained for lowered tax
rates and more advantageous delivery of services in order to remain in town. 1T'ying to compensate for
a "bad business climate," local officials often have made major concessions to corporations.).
120. Id. at 369 (stressing that local government assistance, including tax breaks, low-cost financ-
ing, cheap land, and subsidization work forces, is an insignificant factor in affecting corporate
location decisions).
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more employment opportunities than large firms.' 2 Moreover, small businesses
tend to spend or reinvest their income locally rather than transfer it to share-
holders in another region. 22
There are, however, substantial disadvantages in using small businesses as the
primary agent for redevelopment. Employment in small firms is precarious be-
cause their failure rates are high. 123 Small companies typically offer low wages
and often overlook or are exempted from federal and local rules governing hiring,
wage, and workplace policies. 124 They offer fewer opportunities for training in
skilled areas and occupational advancement than do large firms. In light of these
factors, small businesses should be seen not as a panacea to urban blight but as
part of a broad spectrum of business forms generating job opportunities. 125 In the
end, the enterprise zones may serve merely to induce relocation of businesses and
skilled workers from areas subject to normal taxation, leading to large federal
and local revenue losses. Such relocation would neither add to the total number
of firms nor increase employment among residents of the zone. 26
The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions (AFL-CIO) does not support the enterprise zone scheme. 12 7 The labor
organization firmly rejects proposals intending to lower the minimum wage and
to loosen laws regulating the workplace. Although such provisions were initially
proposed, they have been deleted from the current draft of the enterprise zone
plan. The union continues to reject the plan for what it terms a piecemeal
approach and its inadequate substitution for a comprehensive reindustrialization
program. The union believes that the scheme will result only in giveaways of
badly needed public funds and wasteful competition for existing businesses with-
out any net addition of jobs. 28 The AFL-CIO advocates an industrial policy that
would set up a national industrial board to help revitalize the nation's sick
industries and decaying communities. 29 Funds would be obtained through loans
from a National Industrial Development Bank. Urban industrial investment is
thus seen as part of a larger effort to revitalize American industries and realize
full employment. 
30
121. For the Reagan Administration's endorsement of a study by D. Birch on the role of small firms
in creating jobs in the economy, see supra note 50.
122. B. BUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 3, at 222.
123. Birch, supra note 50, at 7.
124. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 3, at 224.
125. House Hearings, supra note 80, at 15 (statement by Marc Bendick, Jr.).
126. House Hearings, supra note 80, at I (AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted at the Fifteenth Constitu-
tional Convention in statement by Arnold Cantor, Assistant Director, Department of Economic
Research, AFL-CIO).
127. AFL-CIO, Fact Sheet No. 25 (Mar. 5, 1982); Telephone interview with Steven Coplan, Legal
Counsel of the AFL-CIO (Oct. 14, 1983).
128. Altman & Garten, The Fallacy of Modern-Day R.F.C., N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, § 3
(Business), at 3 (urging Washington to bankroll the reindustrialization of the U.S. economy).
129. House Hearings, supra note 80, at I (AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted at the Fifteenth
Constitutional Convention in statement by Arnold Cantor, Assistant Director, Department of Eco-
nomic Research, AFL-CIO).
130. Id. at 2.
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III. CONCLUSION
Older urban areas, once the focus of industrial development, are by and large
decaying. As a tool of urban industrial policy, the enterprise zone legislation
attempts to remedy acute problems of industrial decline by encouraging busi-
nesses to reinvest and bring jobs to the unemployed. Through the enterprise zone
proposal, the Tory Government offers and the Reagan Administration would offer
incentives to stimulate investment in the inner cities, but at the same time reduce
their overall commitment to local areas. The Tory Government has at least
attempted to designate enterprise zones in areas already receiving government
assistance. The scope of the British legislation is more specific than its U.S.
counterpart. U.S. policy makers should examine the effectiveness of the British
attempt to integrate enterprise zones in larger redevelopment programs. The U.S.
has not yet shown how the enterprise zone bill would complement other urban aid
programs to reduce the decline of inner city communities.
Implementing the Reagan Administration's enterprise zone legislation would
be straightforward: firms would need only to locate within set boundaries to
benefit from tax breaks. Firms would not need to meet any other requirements,
such as growth targets or creation of training facilities. The primary objective is
to realize business investment, regardless of the amount, based on the assump-
tion that new businesses create new jobs. The program represents a new experi-
ment in economic development. It would test whether a package of tax incentives
can lead to urban revitalization.
The proposal, however, presents significant difficulties. These tax incentives
may not be the right type of catalyst to transform decayed neighborhoods into
places where industries will locate. Instead, they may lead to large revenue losses
with no concomitant gain. Yet, communities in which these enterprise zones
would be located have also experienced severe decline in areas such as services
and housing stock. The proposed legislation does not address these issues.
Furthermore, the U.S. proposal focuses on small businesses as a means to
create jobs, whereas the British proposal is not so narrowly tailored. Economic
recovery is gaining new momentum, and businesses may seek new opportunities
and new workers. The influence of small businesses on the national economy,
however, is too uncertain too ensure continued growth in employment. 131
131. The discussions on the role of the small firms versus large firms in creating jobs in the
economy raises conflicting analyses. Birch states that assisting large firms has a long history of not
working and claims that smaller businesses do not want direct assistance. Birch, supra note 50, at 11.
Contra House Hearings, supra note 80, at 3-4 Congressman Jack Kemp, a proponent of the bill,
states that federal assistance in fact cannot reach small businesses. These businesses often fail, which
is embarassing to federal agencies).
